THE DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF
UNION REMEDIES
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The doctrine that an expelled or suspended member of a
labor union must first exhaust his remedies within the union
before obtaining judicial relief, presents a problem of equating two apparently contradictory interests, (1) the protection of the member's civil rights and (2) the necessity of
group solidarity for the union. It is difficult to balance the
scales. To give too much weight to one or the other of the
two interests involved can be very detrimental either to the
individual member or to the union.
If the number of disciplinary abuses is viewed merely in
its ratio to the total number of union members, the problem
would seem to be of little significance.' However, we are
concerned here with an individual's civil rights, and any such
proportional analysis must be cast aside. To state a truism,
there have been well-known cases of disciplinary abuse by
unions, 2 and many others never come to light because the
workers lack the means of publicity, or more probably, because the workers are not financially capable of obtaining
court relief.
A union must have some power to relieve itself of discordant elements in order that it may function as a unit; therefore, it has the right to provide by its constitution and bylaws for expulsion of members violating the reasonable
* 3rd year law student, Duke; Temple 1946-1949.

". . . it should be recognized that the disciplinary power has Its
own practical limitations. Since the union's effectiveness is based
largely on the degree to which it controls the available labor supply,
expulsions tend to weaken the union. If large numbers are expelled, it
is likely that they will be driven into the arms of a rival union." Summers, DisciplinaryPowers of Unions, 3 IND. & LAE. REL. REV. 487 (1946).
2 Even the very democratic International Typographical Union provides that, "Any member belonging to, or aiding in the formation of,
any organization dual to the I.T.U. may be summarily expelled by the
Executive Council . . 'when it is deemed necessary to protect the
jurisdiction of the I.T.U."
Shister, Trade Union Government-A
Formial Analysis, 60 Q. J. EcoN. 78, at 95, n. 3 (1945/46). (Emphasis
added).
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provisions of the constitution or by-laws. 3 However, should
this power permit the union to dispense with notice, written
charges, hearing, confrontation of the accusers, cross-examination and other requisites of procedural due process?
Should it preclude freedom to criticize and oppose union
officials?
The purpose of this article is to show: (1) some situations
where the courts have given union members a green light
to seek judicial relief without first exhausting all remedies
provided for by the union constitution, and (2) some of
the courts' reasons for permitting this deviation from the
general rule which requires exhaustion of union remedies
before judicial relief is granted.
The General Rule and the Theory On Which It Is Based
The reports are replete with decisions stating the rule
that judicial remedies are not available to a member wrongfully expelled or suspended from a union unless he has first
4
exhausted such remedies as may exist within the union.
Borrowing from the law of other voluntary asosciations, 5
it has been held that the constitution and by-laws of a union
constitute a contract between its members, and that their
rights and duties, both as between themselves and in their
relation to the association, in all matters affecting its internal government and management, are measured by the
terms of such contract.6
The application of the contract theory to all voluntary
organizations, including labor unions, has been severely
' Barnhart v. United Auto., Aircraft, Agriculture Implement 'Workers of America (UAW-CIO), 12 N.J. Super. 147, 79 A.2d 88 (1951).
' See, e.g., Porth v. Local Union 201, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, 171 Kan. 177, 231 P.2d 252 (1951); Donahue v. Kennedy, 99 N.E.2d 155 (Mass. 1951); Cromwell v. Morrin, 91
N.Y.S.2d 176 (Sup.Ct. 1949); O'Grady v. McFetridge, 334 Ill. App. 390,
79 N.E.2d 644 (1949).
' See Greenwood v. Building Trades Council, 71 Cal. App. 159, 233
Pac. 823 (1925).
6 See cases cited, supra note 4.
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criticized.7

Carrying this theory to its logical conclusion,

a member joining a labor union would have to abide by a

constitutional clause providing for immediate expulsion
without trial or notice.

Fortunately, the courts, though

they talk "contract," have avoided this logical but unjust
result by drawing many and sundry exceptions to the general rule.
Some unions have fairly detailed standards of fair play
and procedural due process.8 By strict application of the
contract theory, a member agrees to these procedural
standards in the constitution or by-laws when he accepts

membership, and it would seem he would be bound by a
decision reached on the basis of such standards. The final
appeal body ultimately must decide whether or not union
law has been complied with. If the union's appeal body

decides that union law has been complied with, should a
court review the disciplinary proceedings de novo, i.e., the

union's decision as to its own rules? It has been held that
a court will not review the merits of a decision by a union

tribunal or its interpretation of valid union rules; under
this rule, review is confined to the question of whether the

member received a fair trial upon proper -ind substantial
evidence. 9 However, it has been pointed out that even this
7 Professor Chafee points out that the member's contract Is often a
legal fiction which prevents the courts from considering . . . genuine
reasons for and against relief. Chafee, Internal Affairs of Associations
Not For Profit, 43 Iltnv. L. REV. 993, 1007 (1930).
See, also, Shister,
op. cit. supranote 2, at 91, n.6.
1 Union disciplinary procedures usually provide for filing of specific
charges in writing, membership referral of charges to a trial committee, timely notice of charges to the accused, and a hearing thereon.
Each side may select counsel from among union members, and-some
unions permit members of the trial committee to be challenged. The
accused has the right to present evidence and to cross-examine prosecution witnesses. A trial committee verdict-majority vote usually
suffices-is generally no more than a recommendation to the next local
meeting at which the accused must be present. If a verdict of guilty
is approved a penalty of a fine or reprimand usually requires a majority vote, while a two-thirds or three-fourths vote is required for
suspension or expulsion. Taft, JudiciaProcedurein Labor Unions, 59
Q. J. Ecox. 381, 384 (1945).
9 Local Union No. 57, Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators and Paperhangers of America v. Boyd, 245 Ala. 227, 234, 16 So.2d 705, 711
(1944). Contra, Gordon v. Tomel, 144 Pa. Super. 449, 446, 19 A.2d 588,
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limited review permits courts to supplement, modify or
disregard the consensual elements of the contractual rela-

tioll between the member and the union.1 0
The fallacies of the contract theory are apparent. Nev-

ertheless the courts still apply it in requiring a disciplined
member to exhaust his remedies within the union before

judicial relief will be granted.

The reason for this refusal

to give up the contract theory may be due to a justifiable

fear of overburdening an already unwieldy court docket.
Whatever the reason for the refusal to abandon the con-

tract theory, it would not seem to justify acquiescence in
a transgression of the civil rights of a union member.

If

the judiciary cannot resolve the dilemma, the legislative
department should. 1
Judicial Bases for Intervention
Assuming application of the contract theory to be un-

sound, the courts are at least consistent in its application.
Thus it has been consistently held that if disciplinary action

against a member is not in accordance with the "contract,"
the rights of the member have been violated, and he may

seek relief in the courts. In such a case, the member2 is not
required to exhaust his remedies within the union.1

Another basis for judicial intervention is where a member's property rights are conceived to have been abridged.
Conversely, a philosophic determination that "property
rights" are not involved would be an independent ground for
596 (1941) (courts must make their own interpretations of union
rules and legal regulations of members).
10 CHAFEE, op. cit. supra note 7, at 1014.
21In Massachusetts an employee expelled from a union may appeal
to a State Labor Relations Commission before he is discharged from
his employment under a union-security contract. The Commission may
order a union, in the union's discretion, to restore the employee to
membership, or to refrain from seeking his discharge. Mss. ACTS C.
657, Sections 1, 2, 6 (1947) amending M.ss. GEN'L L&ws c. 150A (1932).
See the discussion of the ineffectiveness of state regulatory statutes in
SUmnrnEs, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 HAnv. L. REV.
1049, 1056 (1951).
12See, e.g., Polin v. Kaplan, 257 N.Y. 277, 177 N.E. 833 (1931);
Krause v. Sanders, 66 Misc. 601, 122 N.Y.S. 54 (Sup.Ct. 1910), a.f'T
without opinion, 143 App. Div. 941, 127 N.Y.S. 1128 (1st Dep't. 1911).

DUKE BAR JOURNAL

denial of judicial relief. Today virtually all courts recognize the right to a job and interests in benefit funds as
property rights. 13 Seniority rights have been called contract rights in the past, but the tendency is to regard them
as "property."'14 Death benefits and benefits for physical
incapacity, 15 the benefit of collective bargaining, 16 a member's enforceable interest in union elections and an accounting of union funds,' 7 and membership itself, 8 have been
called property rights.
It is apparent that the property theory affords little relief
to a member who has not been expelled but only suspendedfor the property theory is, in most cases, applied only where
dollar values of membership are involved. It has been stated
that membership in a union should confer the right to full
participation in all union activities and should include the
right to attend union meetings in which policies are determined, the right to debate those policies, the right to
vote on them, and the right to vote for union officers 10
At best, the property theory is an inadequate alternative
where a strict adherence to the contract theory would deprive a suspended member of outside relief.
The courts have sometimes been able to hold on to the
contract and property theories, and at the same time intervene whenever they thought a particular type of conduct
should be privileged. This of course is but an ostensible
solution to the problem-a mere escape through the horns
of the dilemma. The courts have no affirmative standards
to go by and they are harassed by fine distinctions and
vagaries.
13

De Mille v. A.F.L. Radio Artists, Los Angeles Local, 31 Cal.2d

139, 187 P.2d 769 (1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 876 (1947).
14 See note, 142 A.L.R. 1055, 1060-61 (1943).
15 Heasley v. Operative Plasterers and Cement Finisher's Int'l. Ass'n.,
324 Pa. 257, 188 A. 206 (1936).
16Obergfell v. Green, 29 F. Supp. 589, 591 (D. D. C. 1939).
17 Dusing v. Nuzzo, 177 Misc. 35, 29 N.Y.S.2d 882 (Sup.Ct. 1941).
I's Fleming v. Moving Picture Machine Operators, 124 N.J.Eq. 269,
1 A.2d 386 (1938) (plaintiff reinstated and union ordered to pay back
wages).
" Summers, op. cit. supra note 11, at 1056.

a criticism of the many exceptions engrafted onto the exhaustion rule, see Witmer, Civil Liberties and the Trade Union, 50 Yale
2For
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Iember MKust

First Exhaust His Remedies Within the Union
Before He Can Get Judicial Relief
It has been suggested that there have been so many exceptions grafted onto the general rule that it itself is now

the exception. 20

Most union constitutions provide proced-

ural machinery with original and appellate jurisdiction and
the machinery so provided is very similar among the different unions.21 But the courts have often allowed an ex-

pelled or suspended member to bypass this procedural machinery.

For example, the courts have refused to require

a member to exhaust his remedies within the union when
the union tribunal lacked jurisdiction, 22 when the member

had no notice of the charges or was otherwise denied a fair
hearing,23 when the member was punished for offenses
not prohibited by the constitution or prohibited contrary to

public policy, 24 and when there existed a variety of other
L.J. 621, 680 (1941). Professor Summers has described it as a "myth."
Summers, op. cit. supra note 11, at 1086.
= Shister, op. cit. supra note 2, at 94.
Nissen v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Stablemen & Helpers of America, 229 Iowa 1028, 1042, 295 N.W. 858, 866
(1941) (exhaustion required however, if union constitution expressly
requires it); Gaestel v. Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators and Paperhangers, 120 N.J.Eq. 358, 185 Atl. 36 (1936); Gersh v. Ross, 238 App.
Div. 552, 265 N.Y.S. 459 (1938); Local No. 7, B.M.P.I.U. v. Bowen, 278
Fed. 271 (S.D. Texas 1922).
2 Washington Local Lodge No. 104 v. International Brotherhood of
Boilermakers, 33 Wash.2d 1, 203 P.2d 1019 (1949) (member also has
right to cross-examine); Armant v. Cannon Employee's Ass'n., 11 L.R.
R.M. 572 (Cal.Super.Ct. 1942); Kennedy v. Schroeder, 10 L.R.R.M.
694 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1942); Heasley v. Operative Plasterers and Cement
Finisher's Int'l. Ass'n., 324 Pa. 257, 188 Atl. 206 (1936). But of. Janow
v. Grad, 5 L.R.R.M. 952, 954 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1939) (expelled member of
local union is not entitled to reinstatement on theory that he was not
tried In accordance with its rules, where he was tried in accordance
with rules of its parent body).
21Schrank v. Brown, 22 L.R.R.M. 2227 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1948) (fair
criticism of union officers is the right of union members and provision
of union constitution suppressing protests of members against actions
by their officers which the members regarded as improper would be
illegal and unenforceable); Morgan v. Local 1150, United Electrical,
Radio and Machine Workers of America, 16 L.R.R.M. 720 (Ill.Super.
Ct. 1945) (expulsion of union member for opposing union's political
activity was illegal).
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Another exception to the general rule of exhaustion has
been recognized when further appeal by the expelled or suspended member would have been futile, vain or excessively
delayed. 26 There is conflict of opinion as to whether a member should be afforded judicial relief on the ground that his

appeal within the union would be excessively delayed. However, it is apparent that since a decision of a lower body

often remains in force until reversed by the convention, a
long interval between conventions may frequently inflict

undue hardships on members.27

Some of these hardships

include loss of work where there is a union security clause

in effect, loss of the right to attend meetings and help formulate union policy, and the loss of death and sick benefits.

Where there is a showing of malice, bad faith or prejudice
Loney v. Wilson Storage and Transfer Co., 14 L.R.R.M, 896
(S.Dak.Cir.Ct. 1949) (appeal procedure so indefinite as to be invalid
under state law which provides that contracts restricting enforcement
of rights through legal proceedings are void); Chew v. Manhattan
Laundries, Incorp., 14 L.R.R.M. 686 (N.J.Ct. Err. & App. 1944) (union
members had not been furnished copy of constitution and by-laws
prior to suspension).
6 Local Union No. 57, Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators and
Paperhangers of America v. Boyd, 245 Ala. 227, 16 So.2d 705 (1944)
(general executive board which was to review his appeal, would not
meet for some time and in a distant city); Reilly v. Hogan, 32
N.Y.S.2d 864 (Sup.Ct. 1942), aff'd without opinion, 264 App. Div. 855,
36 N.Y.S.2d 423 (1st Dep't. 1942) (convention of international union
to which an appeal might have been taken was approximately a year
away); Heasley v. Operative Plasterers & Cement Finishers Int'l.
Ass'n., 324 Pa. 257, 188 Atl. 206 (1936) (no final determination could have
been made until after the expiration of plaintiff's suspension); Lo
Bianco v. Crushing, 115 N.J.Eq. 558, 171 Atl. 778 (1934) (because of prejudice it would have been useless to pursue these rememdies within the
union); Corregan v. Hay, 94 App. Div. 71, 87 N.Y.S. 956 (4th Dep't.
1904) (session of the union court at which the plaintiff's appeal would
be heard would be held in a city many hundreds of miles distant from
the plaintiff's residence). But of. Snay v. Lovely, 276 Mass. 159, 176
N.E. 791 (1931) (the fact that the convention did not assemble until a
year or more after the suspension of the member and then in a city
outside of the commonwealth in which the member has resided did not
affect the rule of exhaustion).
7 Professor Shister observed that in 1945, 39 unions held conventions without exception every year, 44 unions every 2 years, 8 unions
every 3 years, 18 unions every 4 years and 7 unions every 5 years.
Shister, op. cit. supra note 2, 91 at n.6.
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of union authorities, 28 or where there is a total absence of
provisions for effective internal remedy,2

9

the courts will

not require exhaustion of union remedies.
The courts have also refused to follow the rule where the
action was for damages rather than reinstatement. Two
reasons have been given for this: (1) a reversal of the
decree of expulsion would not afford full redress for the
injury to property rights and other damages suffered on
account of expulsion, 30 and (2) to hold otherwise would
allow one of the parties to be arbiter of his own cause.3 1
Generally, the courts will apply the exhaustion rule only
if they have otherwise decided not to give the plaintiff
relief.3 2 Thus, although the courts consistently profess
acceptance of the rule, based on the "contract" theory, they
proceed to create an exception whenever they feel that the
particular members' conduct should be privileged. The
result is a body of law that will guide future courts about
as well as a ship would be guided in a channel without
buoys.
Judicial Remedies
Suppose a union member is expelled or suspended from
his local and he applies directly to a court of equity for
relief. The court decides, on the basis of one of the reasons previously discussed, that the member need not exhaust his remedies within the union. This means nothing
to the disciplined member unless some remedy is provided
which will protect his interests.
' Dragwa v. Federal Labor Union, 136 N.J.Eq. 172, 41 A.2d 32
(1945); Browne v. Hibbets, 25 N.Y.S.2d 573 (Sup.Ct. 1941); Gaestel
v. Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators & Paperhangers, 120 N.J.Eq.
358, 185 A. 36 (1936); Abdon v. Wallace, 95 Ind. App. 604, 165 N.E.
68 (1929).
Simons v. Berry, 240 N.Y. 463, 148 N.E. 636 (1925); Kunze v.
Weber, 197 App. Div. 319, 188 N.Y.S. 644 (1st Dep't. 1921).
0 See, e.g., Smith v. International Printing, Pressmen & Assistants'
Union, 190 S.W.2d 769 (Tex.Civ.App. 1945); Grand Int'l. Brotherhood of
Locomotive Engineers v. Green, 210 Ala. 496, 98 So. 569 (1923); St.
Louis & S.W. Ry. Co. of Texas v. Thompson, 102 Tex. 89, 113 S.W. 144

(1908).
a See Brotherhood of R. Trainmen v. Barnhill, 214 Ala. 565, 108 So.
456 (1926).

2 Summers, op. cit. supra note 11, at 1093.
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A union member has four substantial interests which
may be involved in expulsion from his union: (1) the
right to continue working in spite of a union security provision; (2) the right to participate in union activities; (3)
the right to receive benefit payments; (4) the right to
damages for injuries and indignities suffered in the past.33
An inquiry into the nature of the remedies available and
their effectiveness to protect these interests is imperative.
Usually the disciplined member will bring an action in
equity for reinstatement, and if the court of equity finds
that there has been an improper expulsion or suspension,
it will, by mandatory injunction or otherwise, compel the
reinstatement of the wrongfully expelled or suspended
member.8 4 This remedy entitles him to receive insurance
benefits and to work under a union security clause, as well
as to participate fully in union activities.
Although it has been uniformly held in labor union cases
that mandamus is a proper remedy to restore one improperly expelled or suspended from an incorporated labor union,85 it has been held that this remedy does not lie against
a voluntary unincorporated association. 0 However, later
cases have held that mandamus is a proper remedy of one
expelled from a labor union even though the union may
not be incorporated.8 7 And some jurisdictions have adopted this rule by statute.8 s
In addition to a suit for reinstatement, either by an
equitable action or by a writ of mandamus, one unlawfully
Summers, op. cit. supra note 11, at 1093.

" See OAE s, Organized Labor and Industrial Conflicts, sec. 65 at
72 (1927).
I People ex re7. Holmstrom v. Independent Dock Builders' Benev. Union, 164 App. Div. 267, 149 N.Y.S. 771 (1st Dep't. 1914); O'Brien v.
Musical Mutual Protective & Benev. Union, 64 N.J.Eq. 525, 54 A. 150
(1903).
8 People ex rel. Shults v. Love, 199 App. Div. 815, 192 N.Y.S. 354
(1st Dep't. 1922); Jersey City Printing Co. v. Cassidy, 63 N.J.Eq. 759,
53 Atl. 230 (1902); Holmes v. Brown, 146 Ga. 402, 91 S.E. 408 (1917),
*

Smetherham v. Laundry Workers' Union, Local No. 75, 44 Cal.

App.2d 131, 111 P.2d 948 (1941); Elevator Operators & Starters' Union,
Local 117, of San Francisco v. Newman, 180 P.2d 42, 44 (Calif. 1947).
- See, e.g., Nissen v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Stablemen & Helpers of America, 229 Iowa 1028, 295 N.W. 858
(1944); Petri v. Ruehl, 22 N.Y.S.2d 549 (Sup.Ct. 1940).
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suspended or expelled from a union, may sue for the damages thereby occasioned.3 9 The damages recoverable may
include wages lost by discharge, 40 or from inability of the
expelled member to secure employment at his trade.41 Recovery is limited to the difference between the amount he

would have earned at his trade, and that which he actually
earned or could have earned had he sought equivalent
employment.42 Although he is bound to take equivalent

employment, he is not bound to go to another city to look
for work.43

Damages may also include such sums as will

44 It
compensate him for mental suffering or humiliation.

has also been held that an appeal to a higher tribunal in a

union from an order of suspension and fine does not amount
to a waiver of damages resulting from the action of the

union in procuring a member's discharge from employment

45
by a threat to strike.
It has been held that an action against an unincorporated
union which allegedly expelled members improperly, for
damages to recompense for periods of consequent unemployment, may be maintained despite the contention of the

union that the association is not liable unless all the members can be shown to be liable.46 However, in many states
the union cannot be held liable for the acts of its members
or its officers unless the membership as a whole has approved or consented to the improper expulsion or suspenOuas, op. cit. supra note 34, sec. 69 at 77.
10Fleming v. Moving Picture Machine Operators of Essex County,
16 N.J. 502, 1 A.2d 850 (1938).
a Stenzel v. Cavanaugh, 189 N.Y.S. 883 (Sup.Ct. 1921).
12 Johnson v. International of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters
& Joiners, 54 Nev. 332, 16 P.2d 658 (1932).
Connell v. Stalker, 21 Misc. 609, 48 N.Y.S. 77 (Sup.Ct. 1897).
" Nissen v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs,
Stablemen & Helpers of America, 229 Iowa 1028, 295 N.W. 858 (1941);
St. Louis & S.W. Ry. Co. of Texas v. Thompson, 102 Tex. 89, 113 S.W.
144, 19 Ann. Cas. 1250 (1908).
Blanchard v. Newark Joint Dist. Council, 77 N.J.L. 389, 71 A. 1131
(1909). See St. Louis & S.W. Ry. Co. of Texas v. Thompson, supra note
44, for the proposition that exemplary damages are recoverable against
persons who are actuated by malice in procuring the member to be
expelled.
48 Glauber v. Patoff, 15 Lab. Rel. Ref. Rep. 948 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1944).
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sion. 4 7 This rule unjustly prevents recovery from the union
treasury except in rare cases, although the officers were
clearly acting in their official capacity as agents of the
union. To permit the disciplined member to sue the officers
for the damages resulting from the improper expulsion or
suspension is of little value because the officers may own
little property in their own name.
Weaknesses of Judicial Remedies
It is at once apparent that the present judicial remedies
are hardly adequate. In a given case the court may require
the disciplined member to first exhaust all his remedies
within the union and hence a court action for reinstatement
may come too late to be of much value. During the appeal
period within the union, which may often be a very long
time,48 the disciplined member is being deprived of current
income and his right to participate in the formulation of
union policy.
Court actions are, in most cases, too expensive and an
appeal is, financially speaking, usually out of the question.
The union on the other hand, with its greater resources,
can carry the case through the courts for a very long time.
Even though the expelled member has obtained judgment,
the award of damages may be worthless if the court applies
the rule that the membership as a whole must have approved or consented to the wrongful discipline.
The courts could correct these weaknesses to some extent
by giving interim protection to the disciplined member
pending his appeal within the union, e.g., by prohibiting
his discharge under a union security clause until the final
appeal has been heard. Financial obstacles could be removed through legislation providing for an agency to act
as a public prosecutor, by permitting recovery of multiple
damages, by including attorney's fees in the measure of
damages and by permitting recovery of damages out of the
union treasury. 49
47 Browne v. Hibbets, 25 N.Y.S.2d 573 (Sup.Ct. 1941); People ex rel.
Solomon v. Brotherhood of Painters, 218 N.Y. 115, 112 N.E. 752 (1916).
See note 25 supra.
Summers, op. cit. supra note 11, at 1096.
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Remedies Under Taft-Hartley
Under Section 8(a) (3) (B) of the Taft-Hartley Act,"0
it would be an unfair labor practice for an employer to discharge an employee under a union security clause for reasons other than the failure of the employee to tender the
periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly, required as
a condition of acquiring or retaining membership. Under
Section 8 (b) (2) of the Act, it is an unfair labor practice
for the union to cause an employer to discriminate against
an employee in violation of Section 8 (a) (3) (B).
However, the Taft-Hartley Act has not gone far enough
in one direction; i.e., it only protects the disciplined member's right to work. And it has gone too far in the other
direction; i.e., it unduly restricts the union in its control"
over its membership. As in the case of a direct action for
reinstatement, there is lacking in Taft-Hartley any provision for interim relief and it may be months before the
Board can act on a particular case of union disciplinary
abuse. 5 ' The disciplined member is somewhat aided by Section 301 (b) of the Act, since by this section he can sue the
union for damages. However, he must still rely for reinstatement on the judicial remedy, the inadequacies of which
remain unaffected.
Conclusion
Of an estimated total of 14.8 million workers covered by
written agreements in 1946, over 11 million, or 78%, were
working under union-security provisions which in one form
or another required union membership as a condition of
hiring or continued employment, or both.5 2 Thus union
membership is a prerequisite to earning a living in many
fields. In view of this situation, the doctrine of exhaustion
0 The Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, as amended, 61
Stat. 140, 141, 29 U.S.C.A. sec. 158(a) (3), 158(b) (2) (Supp. 1951).
1 In a Bill to Amend the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, submitted by
the American Civil Liberties Union, covering all phases of internal
union democracy, it was proposed the enforcement of the legislation
could best be lodged not in the courts, but in the National Labor Relations Board, with authority to prosecute violations as unfair labor
practices. The bill was never accepted.
0 U.S. DEP'T. LARoR, BuR.LA.STAT., BuLL. 908 (1947).

160

DUKE BAR JOURNAL

of remedies does not adequately protect the rights of the
individual worker.
In many instances the disciplinary procedure of the union, which is a quasi-judicial process, does not meet even
the most essential requirements of an ordinary judicial proceeding, i.e., notice of the charges and a fair hearing; nor
does a court order generally redress the whole wrong once
the court has been persuaded to take jurisdiction. To promote substantial justice it is imperative that union disciplinary procedure should be analogous to that observed in
ordinary judicial proceedings.13 The courts should hold the
union to greater exactness in its statement of the rules governing expellable offenses, and the appellate procedure
within the union should be required to comply with certain
minimum standards respecting effectiveness, certainty, and
promptness. 4
The doctrine of exhaustion of remedies was borrowed
from the older laws of voluntary associations and applied to
labor unions. 55 This of course is unjustified. Labor unions,
other voluntary associations, and the courts assert that the
purpose behind the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies is
control of membership. However, the validity of the rule
does not carry over to unions which have ceased to be voluntary. To compare a labor union with an ordinary voluntary association or fraternal order is to shun the realities
of the situation. With the tremendous growth of centralized union administration and its concomitant risk of misuse of disciplinary power, 0 this borrowing from the older
0 See Gallagher v. Monaghan, 58 N.Y.S.2d 618 (Sup.Ct. 1945); Coleman v. O'Leary, 58 N.Y.S.2d 812 (Sup.Ct. 1945).
" See Leo v. Local Union No. 612, 126 Wash. Dec. 466, 174 P.2d 523
(1946) for an example showing a step toward holding the union to
greater exactness in its statement of the rules governing expellable
offenses. The Washington court found that even if the charge against
the plaintiff, of soliciting membership for another union from among
defendant's members, were true, the offense did not come within the
expellable offenses set out in the constitution, such as creating dissension among members, destroying the interest and harmony of the
local union, or seeking to dissolve the local union.
Gallagher v. Monaghan, supra at note 53.
Shister, op. cit. supra note 2, at 94.
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law of voluntary associations no longer has any merit, and
should be abandoned.
By applying the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies with
its multifarious exceptions, there has been evolved a thoroughly confusing field of law. Perhaps the situation might
be most effectively ameliorated if the legislature created
special labor tribunals composed of specialists in the field
of labor relations, with authority to review cases of expulsion and suspension of union members. These special labor
tribunals could lay down criteria which would help the
union maintain group solidarity and efficient administration, and at the same time insure to the members of the
union a maximum freedom of expression and action.

